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Álvaro Seviúa-Buitrago
The current crisis, with its particularly severe configuration in Southern
European countries, provides an opportunity to probe the interrelation
of economic crunches and the praduction of space, and also to imagine
potential paths of sociospatial emancipation from the dictates of global
markets. This introductory chapter offers a preliminary interpretive
framework exploring the fundamental role of urban and territorial
restructuring in the formation, management and resolution of capitalist
crises and, conversely, periods of crisis as key stages in the history of
urbanization. I will begin by contextualizing the 2007-8 economic slump,
the subsequent global recession and its uneven impact on states and
cities in the longue durée of capitalist productions of space, studying the
transformation of spatial configurations in previous episodes of economic
stagnation. This broader perspective will then be used to analyze currently
emerging formations of austerity urbanism, showing how the practices of
crisis management incorporate a strategy for economic and institutional
restructuring that eventually impacts on urban policy, and indeed in the
production of urban space itself.
I will start this discussion with two basic premises. Firstly, capitalism
is a crisis-prone system. Crunches and recessions appear as the aggregated
result of a continuous and contradictor y process of expansion of value;
they are structural aspects of capitalist development, not an aberration in
a naturally balanced economic organization (Harvey, 2010). According to
this viewpoint, the history of capitalism is staged as an evolution through
successive regulatory regimes articulated around the emergence and
overcoming of recurring crises of overaccumulation (Aglietta, 2000).
The current predicament is therefore not an exception but just another
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manifestation of a broader developmental pattern that we can compare and
contrast with previous conjunctures and political-economic responses.
Secondly, the production of space and the regulation thereof are key
moments in the dynamics of capitalist accumulation and its reproduction.
Spatial configurations work at many levels of a given social formation,
either as means or sites of production, as productive forces or social
relations, as governmental apparatuses or collective representations, and
so forth (Lefebvre, 1991).The circulation of capital under capitalism relies
heavily on a relentless reorganization of these configurations at several
scales, both to expand the network of production and as a means to absorb
surplus value (Harvey, 1975).
What happens when both phenomena overlap in time? How is the
logic of capitalist production of space transformed in a time of crisis?
The capitalist mobilization of the production of space is especially acute
during economic crunches (Gottdiener and Komminos, 1989)' In such
conditions the very creative destruction of territorial formations turns
into a key vehicle for crisis management through the orchestration of
successive layers of spatial and economic restructuring. As Lefebvre
suggested, '[cjapitalísm has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve)
its internal contradictions for a century ... We cannot calculate at what
cost, but we do know the means: by occupying space, by producing a
space' (Lefebvre, 1976:31). David Harvey (2006a) has elaborated upon
this hypothesis in his analysis of short- and medium-term 'spatial fixes'
to capitalist crises. Amongst other means, capitalism tends to overcome
recessions through inner and outer rearrangements of space that allow
the displacement and deferral of contradictions geographically and
temporally so that immediate devaluation of capital is avoided. In a recent
work Harvey (2014) extends this idea by suggesting that capitalism thrives
and resolves its crises through a constant shift of its contradictions from
one structural or productive moment to another, from one economic
sector to another, from one scale to another, from one region to another,
or between these different elements themselves. By circulating local
and context-specific confticts capital manages to reconfigure the limits
to accumulation. However, this procedure simply internalizes capitalist
contradictions in new temporally and spatially evasive maneuvers. In
the long run there is no possible 'absolute fix' for the system and local
crises develop into global depressions. As these preliminary propositions
suggest, there is a particular dialectic whereby spatial (trans)formations
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are fundamental to understanding the onset and subsequent evolution of
any given crisis and, vice versa, crises management patterns are essential
indexes to grasp how the regulation and production of space is constantly
recast unüer capitáñsm.
Let us consider this dialectic movement in detail with a first glance at
the development and spatial mutations of the current conjuncture. As a
result of the dotcom bubble at the end of the 1990S and the early 2000S,
and the parallel decline of stock-markets, surplus capital changed the
target and investment in property and related assets soared worldwide.
The pace of urbanization and construction was particularly intense in the
US unti12007, when the crisis broke as a compounded result ofhousing
overproduction and speculation in real estate and mortgage markets. From
the US, the crisis spread unevenly around the world, impacting on diverse
regions depending on their position in the international division oflabor
and the geopolitical scene. Through these trends the crisis has developed
and deepened previous patterns of uneven geographical development, an
aspect that is completely obvious in the European case, where the crisis
has widened the gap between Southern and Northern Europe. There
is, therefore, a horizontal, geopolitical distribution (or spatial mutation)
of the crisis. It is also important to consider the transformations in the
nature and scales of the crisis throughout the years. Starting as a crash at
the level of built environment production and the related credit system,
the crisis adopted a financial form soon. The collapse of stock-markets
turned into a global recession and a sovereign debt crisis when certain
governments decided to save their banks from bankruptcy. Finally, the
nation-state crunch is becoming a crisis of particular regions and cities
as national and supranational agencies push down budgetary pressure
to regional and local governments in the form of new austerity policy-
regimes. Hence there is also a vertical, scalar circulation of the crisis,
from one country to the globe, to specific regions and cities -and, even,
particular neighborhoods- in other countries.
The synthesis above may oversimplify the actual intricacies of
recent economic decline, but it allows us to grasp the crucial role of the
production of space as both a cause of the crisis and a strategy to manage
and overcome it. Two spatial fixes stand at the temporal extremes of
the recession, showing that the absorption of surplus capital at a given
point provides just a temporary solution, one that is likely to generate
deeper contradictions in a subsequent stage of development. The
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potential administration of this confiict-ridden process through rational
management - such as that provided by the most lucid manifestations of
reformist town and regional planning - is always abandoned in the long
run. The circulation of capital through built environments demands a
systematic, ever-expanding reconfiguration ofinherited spatial formations
in order to avoid obsolescence and devaluation, andoas a material basis for
subsequent rounds of investment and accumulation. In that sense, real
estate speculation and constant urbanization and re-urbanization are
not a deviation, but are essential to the survival of capitalism (Harvey,
2oo6a:398). As Brenner and Theodore argue:
[C]apital continually renders obsolete the very geographícal landscapes it
creates and upon which its own reproduction and expansion hinges. Particularly
during periods of systemic crisis, inherited frameworks of capitalist territorial
organization may be destabilized as capital seeks to transcend sociospatial
infrastructures and systems of class relations that no longer provide a secure
basis for sustained accumulation. As the effects of devaluation ripple through the
space-economy, processes of creative destruction ensue in which the capitalist
landscape is thoroughly transformed: the configurations ofterritorial organization
that underpinned the previous round of capitalist expansion are junked and
reworked in orderto establish a new locational grid for the accumulation process.
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002:354-5).
These spatial transformations require and at the same time trigger
associated processes of institutional and regulatory change, new modes
of urban and regional government, new modes of intervention, and so
on. Each stage of capitalism generates specific regulatory arrangements
that produce a series of historical regimes of urban and regional policy,
including particular assemblages of the state and the private sector,
particular articulations between different state levels and jurisdictions,
and particular interrelations of planning practices and policy with other
moments in the production of space.
1. SPACE ANO CRISIS IN THE LONGUE DURÉE OF CAPITALISM
In this section I will briefiy explore several historical episodes in order to
illustrate how different assemblages of capital and space generate diverse
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crisis regimes in the longue durée of capitalismo Each historical stage of
development privileges certain scales, territories and agencies in the
deployment of new waves of spatial creative destruction in times of crisis.
Accordingly, cities, urbanization and urban policy take on different roles in
the process of spatial and economic restructuring and are in turn reshaped
as they become instrumental in the strategies to manage and overcome
stagnation. These cycles rework not only the urban fabríc, but also the
techniques we use to govern it. It is helpful, therefore, to look backwards
in order to understand the material conditions for the transformation of
urban policy and planning in the past, and to gain some insight about the
potential evolution of the field in the future and the possible scenarios we
will face.
This cursory review starts with the classic case of mid-nineteenth
century Paris, an interesting example for many reasons. First of all is the
fact that Haussmann's grands travaux in Paris and the broader programs
of infrastructural development in the country at large during the Second
Empire were devised strategically to absorb capital and labor surpluses
after a crisis that had threatened to reactivate revolutionary change
(Harvey, 2003). The slump originated abroad; indeed the contradictions
of the production of space had a role in the formation of the crisis: by
the mid-1840S, the railway mania in Britain had unleashed a spiral of
investment and speculation in related assets (Evans, 1848; Berger and
Spoerer, 2001). French capital partook in the short-lived feast. The impact
on French investors and banks was hard when the bubble burst; the Bank
ofFrance, for instance, saw its deposits reduced from 320 million in [une
1845 to 57 million in January 1847 (Traugott, 1983:457-8). France was not
alone in the repercussions of the British crash. The crisis spread to the
entire continental Europe, galvanizing a chain reaction of revolts and
riots in France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the Austrian Empire in 1848
- the so-called Springtime of Peoples (Hobsbawm, 1975:21-4°). Hence
a crash generated as the combined outcome of overproduction of space
and associated financial speculation triggered a sequence of economic and
political crises that developed unevenly throughout the continent.
In France the change of government after the uprisings and the
subsequent coup d'état paved the way for a new approach that relied
heavily and consciously on urban- and national-scale spatial fixes to exit
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the crisis.' The vast program of public works in Paris included not only
the opening of new boulevards carved through the dense city center, but
also the widening and extension of existing roads, the creation of new
parks and hospitals, schools and colleges, markets, prisons and barracks.
New water, drainage and gas systems were adopted as well (Girouard,
1985:288-9). Radiating from Paris, the new national railway system
constituted another (ironic) element of Napoleon III's fix to the crisis. In
the 1870s, immediately after his mandate, ten railway lines arrived in the
capital; three decades before there was only one. France passed from less
than 500 km. of railway line in the 1840S to more than 2.3°0 km in 1880
(Martí-Henneberg, 2013). In brief, a major process ofurban and regional
restructuring reshaped the economic and sociallandscape. Together with
the reinforcement of its centrality in the country, Paris experienced a
complete reconfiguration of the relation between the inner city and the
peripheries, with the reorganization of residential areas along class lines
and new locational patterns for industrial and retail activities.
These spatial transformations required parallel efforts of institutional
and regulatory restructuring. New legal and technical frameworks
were developed to implement the interventions. A new urban form of
governance emerged, with distinctive relations between the national and
the local state, as well as novel alliances between public administration and
private enterprise. Indeed, the Second Empire's growth machine hinged
as much upon Haussmann's vision and managerial capacity as it did upon
his financial creativity and relation with venturesome investors. Only in
Paris the public works expenditure between 1853and 1869 amounted to a
previously un seen figure of 2.5 billion francs, which Haussmann would
gather from a number of sources including public bonds and loans from
new financial agencies such as Crédit Foncier de France and the Société
Générale du Crédit Mobilier, both created by the Pereire brothers, who
were also directly involved in the creation of railways, gas supply, public
transit systems and, of course, residential building (Harvey, 200P13-120).
In short, the rescaling of urbanization and infrastructural development
triggered the formation of the modern credit system in France. Both the
spatial and the financial fixes of the Second Empire collapsed together in
1 I Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had expressed beforehand his support for the
active promotion of economic prosperity through investment in public works
(Bonaparte, 1840:59).
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the late 1860s, when their aggregated contradictions hit again. The crash
of risk capital put an end to Haussmann's projects and Napoleon III's
mandate. The resulting crisis would incite anew the specters of revolution
in the 1871Commune.
Jumping forward a few decades we meet another key crisis period,
the 1930S Great Depression in the USo Despite the huge number of
studies on the 1929 crash, few economists have taken note of the previous
development of a real estate bubble and subsequent fall in the mid-1920S,
starting in Florida and spreading to the whole country. In just a few years
land development and housing rose irrationally in Florida, fuelled by a
feverish wave of investment that galvanized an emerging middle-class,
By 1925 the exchange in land property and associated shares had become
a purely speculative dynamic, with scarce relation to actual construction
activity: lots could be sold several times in a single day (Frazer and Guthrie
[r., 1995)· The bust in the state was just the tip of the iceberg and the
whole country experienced a steady decline in real estate development
the following year. As White (2009) shows, this contraction marked the
starting point of the stock issues boom, with massive doses of surplus
capital being transferred to the equity market as an alternative investment.
Again, we see the close relation between the confticts at the level of spatial
production, financialization and economic crises.
Roosevelt's New Deal tried to tackle the depression by mobilizing
spatial policies in several ways. Firstly, during the intense years under
the dominance of the first Brain Trust -including strong supporters of
central planning such as Rexford G. Tugwell and Arthur E. Morgan-
a program blending civil works in both the city and rural areas and
a back-to-the-land vision promoted a substantial restructuring of the
social geography of the country. Agencies such as Milburn L. Wilson's
Subsistence Homesteads Division, Morgan's Tennessee Valley Authority
or Tugwell's Resettlement Administration were attempts at countering
the spontaneous deterioration of rural regions under capitalist uneven
spatial development, taking the regeneration thereof as an opportunity to
foster economic development and pacify urban unrest by moving surplus
labor power to the countryside. After 1936, however, a more pragmatic
anti-cyclical approach was adopted to stimulate construction activity
that would reshape the sociallandscape of the nation. One the one hand
the federal government guaranteed private domestic mortgages for the
middle-classes in order to ease credit ftow and prevent foreclosure; on the
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other hand, the administration launched a concerted effort to build public
housing for the working-class and the 'deserving' poor. While agencies
such as the Public Works Administration and the United States Housing
Authority and its state branches focused on building collective housing in
inner-city neighborhoods for low-income population groups, the Home
Owners' Loan Corparation and later the Federal Housing Administration
established redlining practices using class, race, typological and locational
criteria, insuring mostly middle-class, white, single-family houses in the
suburbs (Jackson, 198p90-218). Together with the investment in the
expansion of the road and highway system, this strategy secured new
niches ofhousehold consumption, fostering a process of suburbanization
and spatial segregation that would pervade the post-war era (Hayden,
200}128-153)·
Thus a new national horizon of economic recovery was established
based on a profound reconfiguration of preexisting social divisions of
space. The polarization of housing patterns along class and racial lines
remained as a contradictory legacy of an alleged progressive periodo At all
events, the New Deal restructuring was not limited to a reorganization of
core-periphery-suburb relations. As was the case with nineteenth-century
France, the redesign of the urban fabric required major regulatory and
governmental reforms - with the federal and regional administrations
assuming an unprecedented role in the management of local activity -
and also a strong rearganization of the relations between the state and the
financial sector. The 1930Scrisis paved the way for an increased presence
of the nation scale as the pre-eminent level for accumulation and the
regulation of political-economic life (Brenner and Theodore, 2002:358).
1 have focused here on the US for its central role in the geopolitical
context and its ascendancy in this path at that time, but of course similar
arguments apply to most of the contemporary Western world and their
concurrence in what some have termed the Fordist exception (Neilson and
Rossiter, 2008).
The US and, particularly, New York City, led the outbreak of the next
episode in this quick overview of the connection of crises to majar spatial
restructurings, and indeed one that might be read as the inception of our
current predicament. Several authors have identified the management of
New York City's fiscal crisis in the 1970S as the blueprint for subsequent
nation-wide neoliberalization agendas in the US and abroad, inaugurating
a trend of austerity measures in social welfare, incentives to business,
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and intervention in local affairs by supra-municipal agencies, corporate
interests and unelected institutions (Harvey, 2°°5:48; Tabb, 1982:9;
Zevin, 1977).2In the late 1960s the decline of manufacture and suburban
fiight eroded the local revenues; the city was more and more dependent
on federal funds. In view of the growing deficit, however, the Nixon
administration changed its approach and began to diminish federal aid
in 1972. 'The urban crisis', declared the president, should be refashioned
as an 'urban opportunity' (Nixon, 1972). The Manhattanite financial
elite understood the gist behind the message: urban restructuring could
become not only a chance to exit the crisis but also a bridge to restore
upper-class power and capital preeminence after a long period of state-
rule oriented to maintain welfare programs.
For a couple of years the banks covered the gap left by federal
retrenchment but in 1975, amidst a global recession, they finally decided to
stop rolling the debt over (Tabb, 1982:21-2).New York City faced technical
bankruptcy. In lieu of direct subsidies, the (Republican) state government
and financial institutions put the city under the control of a bailout
agency, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, followed by the Emergency
Financial Control Board, incorparating representatives from the financial
and corporate spheres. The new agenda should be as innovative as
exemplary. According to Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, the
program had to be 'so punitive, the overall experience so painful, that no
city, no political subdivision would ever be tempted to go down the same
road'.' And so it was. In little more than ayear the city fired almost 50,000
employees and cut down welfare departments' budget by 25 percent;
additional rollback would ensue after the initial shock treatment (Tabb,
1982jo). The new agenda also included a transition to entrepreneurial
approaches to urban governance, whereby the local administration should
not only strive to create a good business climate through all manner of
incentives, but also to brand the city itself as a majar cultural hub and,
of course, as a succulent niche for real estate investment (Greenberg,
2008). Together with finance and ancillary activities, the restructuring
of the urban fabric through successive rounds of gentrification reshaped
2 I Of course, more violent, merciless versions of a new experimental
neoliberalization were imposed on a national scale in contemporary Chile and
other Latin American countries afterwards.
3 I Quoted in Harvey (2005:46).
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the local economy (Harvey, 2005:47). In these processes new alliances
of public and private actor s fostering corporate profit opened a path of
institutional change that would spread later to other scales and regions.
The neoliberal agenda imposed by Reagan in the US, Thatcher in
Britain, and in Europe and other countries afterwards, had of course a
national and global horizon, but its impact was especially severe in cities.
May large metropolises bore the brunt ofbudgetary austerity and became
the major victims of rollback policies. Indeed, as Brenner and Theodore
(2002) suggest, in the following years they became a crucial arena for
economic and regulatory restructuring, a pivotal point to displace and
manage the crisis. Certain cities and city-regions transformed into nodes
of a new planetary division of labor that would widen the gap between
global centers and global peripheries. They worked as the engines of a
new round of uneven spatial development and as key sites for regulatory
experimentation, with state institutions being constantly recast at the
local scale as protean galvanizers of transnational surplus capital. This
blend of intense governmental restructuring, inflexible austerity and
entrepreneurial urbanism is at the root of today's round deepened urban
neoliberalization.
2. THE AGE OF AUSTERITY AND THE ALTERNATIVES
FOR PLANNING
[E]conomic recovery was never the point; the
drive tor austerity was about using the crisis, not
solving it. (Krugman, 2012:n.p.)
The crisis today presents strong structural similarities with the cases
above. Again, following conditions of capital overaccumulation, a massive
switch of surplus wealth from the primary (production of standard
commodities) to the secondary (production of space and the built
environment) circuit of capital triggered property market speculation and
securitization, which in turn led to the collapse of the financial system
and a global recession. Far from inciting institutional change oriented
towards a progressive reform of the system, the outcome in terms of
policy is a redoubled effort to extend the neoliberal agenda further (Hall
et al, 2013). In fact the 1970S recession and subsequent transformations
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in urban governance are especially relevant in the context of the current
conjuncture for several reasons. Given that Western governmental
agencies and international economic institutions are pushing to 'exit' that
model's crisis through a development of its main tenets, many authors
suggest that we are undergoing a stage of deepened neoliberalization (e.g.
see Callinicos, 2012; Peck et al, 2012). Of course, the austerity recipe and
the strategic use thereof are not new. A common mantra since the early
1980s, 'austerity' is the perfect euphemism for fiscal retrenchment and
the dismantling of the welfare state. Left aside of the severe rollback as
a necessary evil, the veritable cause for the sovereign debt crisis - the
trillions spent in the public bailout of private banks and other financial
institutions - becomes an opportunity to further downsize the public
sector. As Harvey (2006b:154-5) contends, crisis management is in fact one
of the fundamental modes of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession -
that is, of accumulation through direct extraction of profit out of public or
common forms of collective wealth.
But the distribution of this agenda is spatially variegated, socially
unequal, and it deepens earlier paths of policy rescaling and restructuring:
the impact is most severely felt by certain population groups living in
vulnerable areas in cities located in already weak regions and countries. As
was the case during previous crises, the outcome ofthe recession intensifies
preceding trends of uneven geographical development according with
specific patterns of path-dependency in terms of economic restructuring,
social change and policy innovation (Brenner et al, 2010). In the US, the
epicenter ofthe crisis, there are around 300 municipalities nationwide in
default on their debt (Peck, 2012:633). But the origins and the solutions for
their problems are very different and vary depending on the recent history
of these places. In Rustbelt cities subprime lending was especially intense
in deprived African American neighborhoods, but minor in comparison
to the Sunbelt real estate boom, more focused on middle-class buyers and
speculative investment, which made 'the housing bubble oo. bigger and
more likely to bust' in the South (Aalbers, 20127). However, it is precisely
those states already under structural weaknesses that face harder times
now. For instance, in view of the fiscal emergency at the locallevel, the
state ofMichigan made a controversial move and bailed out cities through
external management, which have taken hold of local policies at many
different levels, including planning programs (Peck, 2012:635).
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The situation is more dramatic in Europe. As Costis Hadjimichalis
(2011:255) suggests, the foundations of the sovereign debt crisis are
embedded in the patterns of uneven regional development at the heart of
the structure of the European Union. In fact, the imposition of extreme
austerity measures in the wake of the financial crisis has reactivated
regional divergence, doing away with the EU's alleged goals of territorial
cohesion and reinforcing the economic and political hegemony of
particular regions and certain forms of capital in central European
countries. Before the crisis 43 percent of the EU GDP was produced in
only 14 percent of its territory; since the euro's introduction Southern
Europe had become a main destiny for German exports, exceeding the
total dispatches to US, China and [apan together in 2007 and developing
a spiraling negative trade balance with Germany (Eurostat, 2°°9:148-9,
152). Both aspects, uneven production and commercial dependence, are
likely to worsen after the imposition of bail out programs which render
the South increasingly subordinated to political decisions coming from
Northern and central countries.
The spatial unevenness of the reaction to the crisis also incorporates
a scalar element. Cities -or, more precisely, particular cities and
neighborhoods within them- are likely to become the major victims in
the medium and long term for several reasons. Firstly, they experience
greater impact from the construction slowdown following credit scarcity
(and, in some cases, the collapse of real estate markets) since housing
and infrastructural development have a stronger role in their economies,
including the collectíon of public revenues through building taxes; a
general state of depressed consumption also hits fundamental sectors of
urban economies such as tourism and conspicuous commercial activity.
Furthermore, compared to rural areas where family and kin networks are
tighter, urban populations are more dependent on formal mechanisms
of social reproduction such as those provided by public services, a sector
under special pressure in a context of austerity. Of course, it is the
disenfranchised population living in large urban areas that bears the brunt
of welfare cuts (Matsaganis, 2011; Hall et al, 2013). Finally, in recent years
certain countries have developed a trend to push down the management
of austerity-derived conflicts to lower levels of government, what Jamie
Peck terms 'scalar dumping': '[c]ities are ... where austerity bites ... The
projection downward of these pressures establishes a socially regressive
form of scalar politics - with cities positioned at the sharp end' (Peck,
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2012:629,631,647). Together, these phenomena create the conditions for
the emergence of an 'austerity urbanism' - again, Peck's (2012) term
- with variegated manifestations across the world but common features
related not on1ywith cities' shared structural elements but also with their
role as key sites to overcome the depression.
Just as this double movement of conflict condensation and regulatory
restructuring in urban areas prolongs the path opened in the 1970s, we
can expect emerging forms of urbanism and urban policy to deepen
the features of previous rounds of policy innovation and institutional
transformation. For the time being we are perhaps witnessing only the
'destructive' moment of this deepened neoliberalization of urban agendas
along the line of the earlier dismantling of managerial, Fordist- Keynesian
urbanismo Public assets and facilities are at the frontline of this new attack
on already meager forms of welfare: public estate and companies are sold,
granted or pulled to pieces as part of the downsize program; potentially
profitable services and goods such as healthcare, education, security and
even public space itself are privatized, submitted to private management,
or charged with user fees; the public administration surrenders normative
and economic prerogatives to corporate agencies and developers, and so
forth.
Though still inchoate, the 'creative' moment of the process is likely
to revisit previous aspects of entrepreneurial urbanism starting from
the new platform provided by these measures. In a context of limited
investment and lending, cities and city-regions will have to reinforce their
strategies to attract capital amidst intensified inter-urban competition.
This trend will widen the gap between the top and bottom tiers of urban
areas, aggravating the predicament of those already under pressure from
economic and social conflicts. Megaproject- and megaevent-oriented
initiatives are to galvanize the public sector of those cities who can afford
such enterprises, and structural developments will probably adopt the
public-private partnership formula on a regular basis, with corporate
investment leading the initiatives in search of profit and leaving the public
sector to assume the risk and unprofitable expenditures. Private interest is
likely to embrace previously progressive urbanisms as novel accumulation
niches, including environmental management and city greening, as
well as urban redevelopment and regeneration of both city centers and
historie peripheries. In a context of construction decline soft urbanisms
will privilege the reorganization of the city's content -rather than the
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built environment itself- as a realm of commodification, as is the case
with the pervasive initiatives of smart cities and the urban mobilization
of big data through new electronic devices and communication services.
However, once real estate markets are reactivated we can expect new
urban developments to spread that, especially in the case of Southern
European countries, could be increasingly targeted at international
corporate investment in high-end touristic areas and capital cities. At an
everyday level traditional public services will probably undergo a process
of segmentation along class lines depending on the users' capacity to
afford fees and extra taxes for enhanced assistance and facilities; those
lacking economic resources will face the bare support ofbasic assistance.
In any case, this dismal view on our urban futures presupposes a
preliminary achievement that is still to be proven: the capacity of deep
neoliberalization to fix the growing contradictions resulting from the
crisis and to govern the intensification of uneven development without
triggering further social upheaval, armed conflicts, environmental
disaster and, of course, new economic collapses. Instead, Brenner et
al (2010:339-341) consider the possibility that a dysfunctional 'zombie
neoliberalism' is developed as a 'putative [solution] to persistent regulatory
dilemmas across scales, territories and contexts', Given the undesirability
of any of these scenarios, it is extremely urgent that we think of potential
alternatives to revive the social breath of planning and urban policy. Four
levels and scales of engagement should articulate this endeavor:
Activist urbanism: The crisis has sparked an archipelago of small-scale
interventions and public space occupations as a direct response to state
retrenchment in fundamental dimensions of sociospatial regulation.
Together with traditional forms of urban social movements and ephe-
meral guerilla urbanisms these new experiences show 'the potential
of the temporary and the mobile to refigure the city around spaces that
were dorrnant, disregarded or dead' (Tonkiss, 2013:322), but also and
especially the importance of laying claim to public space and produ-
cing new regimes of publicity by an active, collective self-management
of the city (Harvey, 2012). Both everyday, piecemeal reappropriations
of the streets and massive urban protests can be assembled through
activist urbanisms to engender novel forms of urban commoning that
palliate the crisis of formal social reproduction and create the oppor-
tunity for a more human urban life.
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Progressive urbanism: On a more formal basis, we need an alliance for
a new progressive alternative to neoliberal planning and urban policy,
including civic leaders, planning practitioners, the non-profit sector
and scholars on the left. These actors should operate as an advocacy
body mediating and aiding the penetration of social movement's
demands in governmental agendas, promoting the renovation of
urbanism's social function and undoing recent entrepreneurial
approaches. At the same time they should develop a convincing
discourse to underpin such new forms of urbanism, appealing to
social justice and democratization to counter the devastating effect of
'common-sense' neoliberal ideologies.
Urban-regional solidarity: The efforts on a local level should be
paralleled with the creation of a network ofinter- urban solidarity acrass
regions andnations so thatthe harmful effects of spatial competition are
lowered, Such networks ought to exchange experiences in regulatory
experimentation, establish common political agendas and elaborate
protocols to resist and support each other in case they undergo fiscal
prablems or face attacks from corporate capital or institutions. Within
Europe this network should include not only cities acrass the South,
but also those suffering from endemic structural conflicts and social
vulnerability in depressed regions in the North and the East,
Rescaled social struggle: The city is not enough. Current patterns of
intensified uneven geographical development show the urgent need
for a realignment of national and supranationallevels of government
pursuing to rebalance social and territorial inequalities. Certain
aspects of the regulation of contemporary social formations cannot
find an apprapriate solution thraugh urban and regional strategies
alone, but need to be orchestrated from higher agencies. In Southern
European countries the main lines of austerity agendas are imposed
by bodies including representatives fram national governments, EU
institutions and international financial agencies, while the detailed
distribution ofbudgetary retrenchment is pushed down to lower levels
of administration - a clear evidence of the need to rescale social
struggle to target power centers beyond the urban scale.
Taken together, these moves gesture towards a collective reappropriation of
planning at several scales, including both those in which the state stands
as the fundamental agency and those currently undergoing a transition
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to a growing presence of forms of commoning and self-management.
Of course, the state is still the fundamental actor in terms of economic
and regulatory innovation; but it is also -as it always was- the main
promoter of advances in the field of planning and the orchestration of
spatial production. In my opinion, the point -at least from a possibilist
perspective departing from the reality of our cities and not from a timeless,
placeless ideal- is to take the state and put them to work for the collective
interest. This does not mean that we have to focus on taking formal,
institutional power and forget about the commons for a while, rather the
reverse. We need to mobilize the energies of commoning to define what
the common good should be, to reorient the state in the right direction.
At the same time, the re-socialization of the state must be implemented
in such a way that, by creating a new public, the state no longer erodes
the commons but, on the contrary, it concentrates efforts to become a
formal infrastructure from which new forms of commons can blossom.
Both projects, the commoning of urban space and everyday life and the
constituent reconfiguration of the state should strive to palliate the current
crisis of socioenvironrnental reproduction, pursuing a new notion of good
living based on the achievement of real sustainability -realized through
the transformation of our lifestyles, not through the proliferation of new
marketable technologies- a project of care and mutual aid -capable of
combining formal and informal networks of social reproduction- and a
commitment to radical democracy.
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